Terrorism can teach a lesson or two
Why does someone get ready to commit suicide for a cause? How do we distinguish the strategies of those terrorists who come to create fear and panic from those who have more precise targets such as killing a leader or blowing a strategic structure or institution? Are there lessons that management science can incorporate from the tactics of the terrorists and strategies of their masters?
In organizational science, we often distinguish between assault and commando approach to tackling a problem. In assault units in army, the line of command is clear and succession plan follow the rank. In commando units, job cannot be done without redefining the meaning of leadership. Depending upon who is closest to the target or who can see the target more clearly, the leadership passes on to the person in a strategic position. That person directs others to take positions as he /she sees most prudent. The target shifts its position and some other commando now has the strategic view of the target and starts directing others as he thinks most effective. The leadership is completely contingent on closeness to/clarity of target. It has nothing to do with the rank. A senior commando would not mind taking directions from a junior commando if he happens to be in the most strategic location having the best view of the target. There is an important lesson here.
Subsidiarity should become the most important rule in hours of crisis. The line of command going through the Home Ministry cannot ever be efficient enough (no matter who is the Home Minister) to find the fastest way of reaching the commando unit to its place of crisis. Once decision is taken to summon commandos, the entire execution should follow a very different line of command than is the case in the conventional matters. Subsdiarity implies that decisions are taken as close to the point of action as possible. The response of airlines, air force and other civil authorities has to follow the emergency routine. The fastest plane available is accessed by the commando unit (even if it means cancellation of some flight by public or private airline) and gets the first priority for landing. The whole thing therefore gets into a fast track – fast response mode with no say for bureaucracies to clear the path of such units. Although the basic decision is made by the political leadership, the execution is left to the levels and units which are most competent to take them.
The people on the job, whether from police, army or other security agencies should have a unified command with the understanding that commando unit will have the authority to follow its own rules.
The police did not recognize its role of reducing anxiety, maximizing information and ensuring networking among the survivors and their kins. When a resident on 16th floor managed to come down, the emergency stairs, what did he hear first? Shouts to get on one side and then command to get herded in a corner. The same person then help of a reporter, walked to the taxi stand, took the taxi to the airport and reached his destination next day morning safely. There was no arrangement for facilitating this process for hundreds of others. Nobody offered cell phone to those who came out [many without any phone] to inform their near dear ones of their safety. Police was ill-equipped to handle a calamity of this order simply because of lack of proper drill for dealing with such emergencies.
What do we learn from those who took extraordinary risks, went far beyond their call of duty and achieved remarkable results in rescue and relief. There were many staff who did that. But, help line of one of the hotels located in Delhi expressed complete helplessness in providing any information. Why should communications break down in hours of crisis? While terrorists were constantly communicating with their masters, our own communication systems among the survivors, with their kins, among the different wings of defence forces, among different wings of intelligence bureaus were ridden with bottlenecks. When critical information does not flow smoothly, it shows not only that the system is sick but also that some perversion has taken place in the core values. If some of the key terrorist had not been released earlier, perhaps so many common people would not have to be sacrificed repeatedly in the country.
The real security arises from a feeling of being included. Exclusion of anyone deliberately and for long can create conditions for alienation. Communication becomes the first casualty in an alienated society or social groups.
One has to ensure that alienation is accepted, analysed and is overcome in a time bound manner. That will require a massive effort at several levels. If South Africa could set up Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, there is no reason why Indian society should not do that to heal the scars of various conflicts that have spurred alienation.
The preparedness of organizations to deal with disaster also depends upon their effort to simulate vulnerability. We probably have not learnt to exploit our moments of vulnerability [when we are closest to ourselves] to gather strength. My suggestions:
a. We should rely as much as possible on internal regulation while defining roles. If some people or process fail in this regard, then replacement of people will serve less purpose than strengthening of processes or both. Unfortunately, we assume that our responsibility ends with the replacement.
b. The fact that Indian police has managed with .303 guns for five decades shows how benign our society has been towards the gun and the people holding it. It did not require a great foresight to recognize the meaninglessness of such a façade of defence.
c. Distribution of scarce resources according to social needs and not political compulsions should be obligatory in a democratic society. If the security staff detailed with politicians is not pruned drastically within next fortnight so as to plug the gaps in public places, we would have proved our immunity to learning.
d. Regular drills for security are prescribed in the codes of disaster management all around the world. How many times have we been having such drills and who has cared to monitor it? I have argued repeatedly that a change not monitored is a change not desired [Gupta, 1984]. If only we could catalogue the lessons of neglect in every firm, establishment and unit [including railways, hotels, educational institutions, etc.], we would understand the need of catharsis, public admission of our guilt and initiation of corrective action.
e. The interrogation of terrorists can provide meaningful insights but should this process be done only by security experts. Sometimes, having an outsider perspective can provide valuable insights. We should involve academics, sometime young students or scholars to listen to the interrogation [after security clearance], and ask so called silly questions. The silliness can be subtle.
f. Need for dialogue with the communities on the margin cannot be obviated. The taxi drivers may be from north India but their social network can provide more valuable insights than all the ethnically homogenized and domesticated communities. The more mobile a community, the more agile are its antennas. We have to incorporate them in the intelligence network.
g. Justice and peace, inclusion and assimilation, catharsis and confession of the injustice have to go hand in hand. No country can feel secure without giving a feeling of complete involvement to every segment of society. We should remember that ruthlessness of LTTE and LET or other terrorists groups in northeast cannot be divided along the religious lines. Terrorists have no religion. Any attempt to label individual behaviour through collective identities is fraught with risks. The identities start internalizing the label. People learn to be helpless.
Any organization which cannot harness the anger for larger social good cannot tap the most powerful source of energy which comes out of passion. Blasts in Ahmedabad were in even more painful, deadly and clever. When somebody deliberately triggers explosions near hospitals after triggering it elsewhere, one can imagine the degree of abomination of the strategic masters of the terrorists. Why does it take so long for India to get angry? Why the brutality of the state in some of tribal regions and other parts gets condoned?
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